رسالة د. كهلان الخروصي
الجزء ١ · صفحة ٤٤… Moreover، this work contains good evidence of how Ib~‡‚ leaders were watching events very closely. We see this in the emphasis of J~bir b. Zayd on attending al-Jum`a (Friday) prayer with al-™ajj~j،(1) his fatw~ regarding the acceptance of the gifts of governors(2) and asking his fellows not to abandon or even weaken their relationships with him and with one another.(3) The book contains a few but valuable traditions that show the success achieved by following this strategy to the extent that distinguished Ib~‡‚ personalities referred to J~bir in most of their religious matters، as in traditions [253]، [254]، [257] and [260]. This enabled them to consider every step they should take to maintain their relation with the mainstream and avoid any disruption to their movement.(4) It seems that this purpose was the essential Ib~‡‚ priority at that time، along with the proper scholarly and religious preparation (tarbiya). Thus we find in the book (in tradition [296]) that they preferred not to become involved in the rebellion of `Abd al-Raˆm~n b. Muˆammad b. al-Ash`ath in 81/700(5) .
(1) See traditions: [65]، [254]، [316].
(2) See tradition: [275].
(3) Tradition: [87].
(4) EI2، III، p.649، s.v. al-Ib~‡iyya.
(5) Most-though not all- Sunn‚ historians claim that all scholars and dignities in Basra have supported Ibn al-Ash`ath in his revolt، see for example: Ibn Kath‚r: al-Bid~yah wa l-nnih~yah، vol.9/37 (Egypt، Matba`at al-Sa`~dah، n.d.).